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Instagram isn’t completely broken, but no one seems to want to fix it (image: Tina Tiller)
Instagram isn’t completely broken, but no one seems to want to fix it (image: Tina Tiller)

MediaNovember 12, 2020

The riveting and troubling story of Instagram’s first decade

Instagram isn’t completely broken, but no one seems to want to fix it (image: Tina Tiller)
Instagram isn’t completely broken, but no one seems to want to fix it (image: Tina Tiller)

No Filter, a superb new book chronicling Instagram’s rise, reveals more about the pathology of Mark Zuckerberg than anything else, writes Duncan Greive.

As with many of the tech companies that went on to blithely mess with society, at first there was nothing but starry-eyed idealism. Instagram founder Kevin Systrom was an aesthete, moved by the world’s beauty, who sought to create a place in which those similarly transfixed could share their photographs. It would allow fans of hiking, architecture or pedigree dogs to document their interests with other enthusiasts around the world in a simple, clean and uncluttered environment. Early account holders did just that, with investment and more mainstream users soon following.

Flash forward to the present day and Instagram is, by many measures, wildly successful, the emblematic social network of the smartphone age – and ridiculously profitable. But the simple, clean, community-minded space Systrom envisaged is gone. In its place is one which has a number of malignant issues it appears chronically unable to solve. 

Instagram has been cited by the UK’s Royal Society for Public Health as the worst app in the world for the mental health of young people, with its highly manicured visions of life prompting anxiety and depression through what it called “compare and despair” usage. Influencer culture exploded through the past decade, with everything from unlabelled advertising, to anti-vaxxer content, to Covid-19 disinformation to QAnon conspiracies rife on the platform. More narrowly, it became a widely used marketplace for opioids for years, and was implicated in black voter suppression during the 2016 US elections.

Instagram co-founder Kevin Systrom addresses a press conference in New York on December 12, 2013 (Photo: EMMANUEL DUNAND/AFP via Getty Images)

It contains multitudes, like all social networks, and does a lot of good or benign things too. Yet the thing it is best at now is making money, not spending that money on fixing its long-running problems. So, after years of watching it drift from what they imagined to what it became, its founders Systrom and Mike Krieger left Instagram a couple of years ago, giving all the appearance of being utterly disillusioned with what had become of the company.

What happened? Facebook happened. No Filter, Sarah Frier’s pacy and brilliantly sourced history of Instagram, is haunted by the fateful 2012 decision to sell up to Mark Zuckerberg on almost every page. In the years that follow, the culture of Facebook (which seems to be really just an extension of the personality of its CEO) gradually smothers what was different and special about the photo sharing app. While the founders were manifestly complicit, along with the whatever-it-takes Silicon Valley atmosphere, Zuckerberg’s gravity exerts a constant pressure on its younger step-sibling, one it proved powerless to resist.

The deal of the century

It’s easy to forget now, but Facebook’s purchase of Instagram, in 2012 for US$1bn in cash and stock, was widely ridiculed. The company it acquired had just a dozen employees and no revenue. There were already a number of photo sharing services in the world, some with a lot of money behind them. Eight years on, and it’s clear this was one of the most far-sighted deals in corporate history – as Facebook’s own business matured, the explosive growth of Instagram allowed it to continue to massively expand its reach and influence through the second half of the 2010s. Along with its acquisition of Whatsapp a few years later, Facebook hoovered up potential competitors before they could achieve sufficient scale and thus cemented its position as by far the most dominant player in social media. 

The irony is that in the early days Systrom didn’t much care for Facebook. He was much more interested in and active on Twitter, whose CEO Jack Dorsey was one of Instagram’s earliest and most influential users. Dorsey also let Twitter’s users easily find their friends on Instagram, providing a huge boost to its early growth. For a while there, it seemed that if any company would invest in or acquire Instagram, it would be Twitter. It didn’t work out that way, as Dorsey was easily out-manoeuvred by a less sentimental opponent in Zuckerberg, who opened negotiations and closed the deal with awe-inspiring speed – a pace and intensity of work that would be great to see applied to some of the long-running issues on all his platforms.

It’s easy to forget now, but social media pre-Instagram was very different. User-generated content was still in its relative infancy. There were few influencers and millionaire YouTubers, and the only platform celebrities had embraced with any great fervour was Twitter. It’s interesting to imagine what might have happened had Twitter won the bidding war – while deeply imperfect, it has often beaten Facebook to innovations like post-suppression and ejecting persistently troublesome users. With Instagram riding sidesaddle, the two networks would have given Facebook a worthwhile opponent, and, as analyst Scott Galloway has suggested, potentially had a business incentive to create a less toxic environment by way of differentiating the product. 

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg in 2019 (Photo: Niall Carson/PA Images via Getty Images)

It didn’t happen – but it took some time before the new owner’s intentions became clear. For the first few years Instagram was largely left to its own devices, physically separated from the voracious growth-centricity of Facebook, tucked away in a small building alongside the carpark on Hacker Way, Facebook’s giant campus. It was still early days for the app-based world – there was a significant and now laughable fear at the time that Facebook would not figure out a way to monetise its audience on phones and tablets, which briefly depressed its stock price.

What Zuckerberg was doing, both with the app audience, and with Instagram, was concentrating on growing the audience at all costs, trusting the now-inarguable truth that once scale is attained, the network effects of sufficiently large groups of users become an impassable moat for competing companies. Only then did he turn on the ad products, and start printing money.

Through that relatively unmolested era you saw the stubborn, clear-eyed design and UX thinking of Systrom. Instagram power users and Facebook execs begged for a regram button, saying it was the best way of allowing its audience to grow, and therefore commit to the platform. Systrom and his team dug in, viewing it as antithetical to the more considered way they wanted its feed to work. Frier recounts this happening over and over, in ways large and small, but eventually the desire for growth, and the Facebook DNA-level desire to crush competition became all consuming. Nowhere has this ever been more visible than in its dealings with Snapchat.

He’s just a jealous guy

Snapchat’s founder Evan Spiegel is the one that got away for Zuckerberg, who resisted his courtship and thus became a target. The creation of Instagram’s smash hit second format ‘stories’ – a simple hijacking of Snap’s signature feature – was a direct response to Spiegel turning him down. No Filter marks that as the point at which Systrom seems to cave to Zuckerberg’s desire to control Instagram, and use it to exact his revenge on Spiegel for daring to resist his embrace. That Facebook is increasingly subject to scrutiny for anti-competitive behaviour is hardly surprising – it’s more a case of “what took you so long?”, and has been happening in plain sight for years.

The irony is that the company which bore the brunt of Zuckerberg’s competitiveness over the past decade was probably Instagram itself. The most compelling theme of No Filter is the one way psychodrama between Zuckerberg and Systrom, whereby Facebook’s CEO persistently starves Instagram of resources and forces it to fold Facebook into deals against clients’ will, motivated more by vanity than business logic, it seems. These sections really hum – the signature flair and tone of BusinessWeek, where the author Frier has spent much of the last decade reporting, soaks into the prose, which is deft in its structure but never over-reaches its material.

Systrom emerges ultimately as a somewhat naive and tragic figure, someone who seems to really believe in the good intentions of his acquirer, and not truly realise his powerlessness until far too late. It’s possible this is an overly generous reading, and that he or someone close to him is a source for No Filter which has helped create that impression. But it seems to scan with the extensive public record of Zuckerberg, probably the single most influential figure of the 21st century.

No Filter is not quite the instant classic of modern Silicon Valley that John Carreyrou’s Bad Blood, the Theranos story, was – largely because the story doesn’t yet have a natural end point. It also lacks for the visceral villainy of Mike Isaac’s Super Pumped – Instagram’s impact is mediated by a screen and at a certain remove, whereas Uber had to look its demons dead in the eye and choose to ignore them. 

Despite that, the ubiquity of Instagram, particularly among young people, gives it a reach and power which make its decisions and omissions incredibly consequential. There are many things about the platform which are admirable, from its function as a tool to politicise and organise young people, to the way it has allowed thousands of small businesses to start with far lower levels of investment than might have been required in the past. The balance of good and terrible in large tech firms makes figuring out a true sense of their contribution to society very difficult. Reviews like this, and media coverage in general, invariably focus more on the bad than the good. Still, it’s difficult to escape the sensation that, much like its parent, Instagram has been far more concerned with chasing growth than patching the known issues for its community.

Other chronicles of the misadventures of tech and capital in the 21st century are chiefly diverting for what they reveal of their sociopathic creators. Instagram’s is different, because Systrom and Krieger scan as relatively centred human beings. Unfortunately, because it was acquired by the most fearsomely detached figure in all of technology, its ultimate fate seems likely to be one and the same.

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MoneyNovember 9, 2020

Analysis: The online ad campaigns fought over the weed and euthanasia referendums

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Which side spent more and why? Jihee Junn crunches the numbers and finds a few misleading claims along the way. 

Ahead of election day, a handful of interest groups took to Facebook and Google to lobby for their respective views on the assisted dying and cannabis referendums. In the end, New Zealanders voted decisively for the former and narrowly against the latter. So what, if any, impact did these groups have on the final result? Along with information provided by First Draft, a nonprofit organisation that provides investigative research to newsrooms tracking and reporting on misinformation and disinformation, we break down who spent what, where and why on Facebook (including Instagram) and Google (including YouTube) from August to October.

Note: Data has been taken from August 2 – October 30. Figures are rounded to the nearest $100 and only groups which spent $10,000 or more during that period have been included.

Cannabis referendum

Make It Legal 

The biggest spender on digital advertising overall was Make It Legal, a pro-cannabis legalisation group funded by donations and run by a community of volunteers. While the group spent nothing on Google despite being a verified advertiser, it put $121,000 into advertising on Facebook  – the most out of any referendum group and the fifth most out of any political advertiser this year (more than the Act Party but less than the Greens).

From August to October, Make It Legal ran 427 ads which touched on a range of reasons to vote in favour of cannabis legalisation, indicative of an A/B-tested, data-led approach to maximise reach and value for money. But as First Draft points out, some ads used partial-context quotes from public figures and cherry-picked statistics. For example, one ad has Jacinda Ardern quoted as saying: “Personally I’ve never wanted to see people criminalised for cannabis use”, leaving out the second half of her sentence in which she says, “but equally I’ve always been concerned about young people accessing it”. While Ardern has since admitted she voted “yes” in the referendum, she repeatedly refused to take a stance prior to the election saying she wanted New Zealanders to make up their own minds on which way to vote.

Another example First Draft points to is an ad stating 80% of New Zealanders had tried cannabis. More specifically, the data refers to a longitudinal study which found 80% of a 1,265-strong “cohort” who were born around the 1970s had used cannabis by their age of 21. This means the statistics roughly refer to the 1990s instead of the situation in recent years. The point is made clearer in this video ad featuring Professor Joseph Boden, director of the Christchurch Health and Development Study, who also wrote on The Spinoff explaining the research back in June.

NZ Drug Foundation

Supported by donations from its members, government funding, and corporate and private grants, the NZ Drug Foundation is a charity working to prevent and reduce drug-related harm. Recognising that “drugs, legal and illegal, are a part of everyday life experience” for New Zealanders, the group takes a harm reduction approach in all its work and took a pro-cannabis legalisation stance for the referendum.

On Facebook, the group spent $23,200 on 58 ads over the three month period promoting animated explainers on how the law would work and making the most of a series of high profile endorsements for the yes campaign from former prime minister Helen Clark, former drug squad detective Tim McKinnel, and actor Sam Neill. One seemingly innocuous ad urging voters to “change cannabis laws for the better” was flagged by Facebook although it’s unclear why.

Meanwhile, on Google, the group spent $10,400 on 18 paid Google search results. Spending peaked at the end of August, presumably in anticipation of the election at its initial date (September 19), and again in the week of the newly scheduled election date on October 17. In total, the group spent $33,600 advertising online. 

NZ Drug Foundation weekly ad spend on Google from August to October

Say Nope to Dope

As the name suggests, Say Nope to Dope is a group opposed to legalising “drug use, drug growing and drug dealing at any level”. Affiliated with organisations such as Family First and Smart Approaches to Marijuana (SAM), its “Kia-Ora Dopey” ad attracted plenty of attention over the course of the campaign for implying that cannabis would be available from dairies and sold to children if legalised. However, despite receiving more than 30 complaints, the Advertising Standards Authority ruled there were no grounds to proceed since it “assisted with conveying the advertiser’s view of what cannabis retail outlets may look like and how the New Zealand way of life might change if the bill is passed” and was allowed to stay in print and on Facebook

In total, Say Nope to Dope spent $31,200 on 39 Facebook ads, several of which, First Draft points out, used statistics out of context. In this ad, the group stated that “30% of drivers who had crashed and died had cannabis in their system” but with no indication as to how much cannabis was present or whether there were other substances. One version of this ad was taken down by Facebook for violating the platform’s advertising policies.

Ads from Say Nope to Dope taken down by Facebook

Other ads taken down by Facebook include a quote from a GP stating she’d seen “too many patients with severe mental illness triggered by cannabis use” (the link with mental illness remains debated) and another citing the legality of medicinal cannabis in order to urge users to vote against legalising recreational cannabis (likely taken down for its depiction of smoking).

Assisted dying referendum

Risky Law

Spending $47,200 on 81 ads over a roughly three month period, anti-euthanasia group Risky Law was the second-biggest spender among referendum groups. It was also the eighth biggest spender among political advertisers on Facebook, spending more than Greenpeace ($38,800) on environmental campaigns but less than conspiracists Advance NZ/NZPP ($57,400). Like the latter, Risky Law’s page has since been deleted. It’s unclear why, but it’s repeated policy violations suggest it may have been deleted by Facebook – it had 18 ads removed due to a violation of Facebook’s advertising policies, although 11 reappeared despite the takedown.

One such ad featured frightening and dramatised portrayal of “poor old mum”, petrified and lying in hospital, as she overhears her children discussing “the best thing for everyone”. Another ad incorrectly claimed a person would have no time to change their mind once doctors approved the assisted dying process (the act states that those deemed eligible can change their minds at any time). It also used misleading language in some of its content, using the term “teenager” in one ad to obscure eligibility criteria (only 18 and 19-year-olds would be eligible under the law).

On Google, Risky Law – advertising under the name Vote No to the End Of Life Act Incorporated – spent a further $29,400 for a total online ad spend of $76,600. Spending peaked during the week starting October 4 when polls opened for advanced voting, and while the group ran 59 ads from August to October, 46 of these were removed by Google for policy violations.

According to its website, Risky Law is a non-profit incorporated society made up of 22 members who are “professionally qualified in medicine, hospice and palliative care, nursing, law, disability, ethics, advocacy, and social policy”. Funded by donations from private individuals, Risky Law states it isn’t aligned to any religious, civic or professional organisations.

Risky Law’s weekly ad spend on Google from August to October

Votesafe.nz

Also on the opposing side of the assisted dying act is Votesafe.nz (or Safer Future Charitable Trust) which spent $33,600 on Google – the most out of any of the referendum groups. It ran almost 180 paid banners, search results and videos from August to October, eight of which were taken down for breaching Google’s advertising policies. Meanwhile on Facebook, the group spent $14,200 on 154 ads. In total, the group spent approximately $47,800

In contrast to Risky Law’s alarmist and negative campaign, Votesafe.nz opted for a more emotional and slightly less confronting approach highlighting real life stories from those with terminal illness. One video tells the story of Vicki who says in 2011, when she attempted suicide, she would’ve opted for assisted dying. “Had it been available, I wouldn’t be here and I’ve enjoyed so many special times since then. You’re not just voting on a law, you’re voting on whether you should kill someone like me.”

Votesafe.nz weekly ad spend on Google from August to October

DefendNZ

Promoted by New Zealand’s oldest and largest pro-life organisation, Voice for Life, DefendNZ lobbied against the assisted dying legislation and spent $19,900 on Facebook advertising in its efforts to do so. It ran a total of 81 ads, some of which compared the End of Life Choice Act to other assisted dying laws overseas in an attempt to highlight its flaws.

Former prime minister John Key, who supports the legislation, was also quoted as saying in at least two of its ads: “In every law, you can never cover every situation. There could be someone that’s coerced, there could be someone who makes the wrong call”. While Key’s comment is presented as speculation in response to concerns raised during a Newshub panel discussion, the group somewhat misleadingly takes it an admission that “there will be euthanasia coercion”.  The quote also obscures Key’s larger point as he continues on to say that “if you looked across the wider population, the massively overwhelmingly majority will get it right, and if they choose [assisted dying], it will be a very small group and it will be very near the end”.

DefendNZ also ran an ad later taken down by Facebook stating that “1,700 Kiwi doctors have publicly come out and said they will be voting no in the euthanasia referendum”. It likely refers to an open letter signed by thousands of doctors saying they believe assisted dying to be unethical. However, their stance on the referendum isn’t explicitly mentioned in the letter.

Yes for Compassion

On the other end of the spectrum is Yes for Compassion, a non-profit organisation funded by donations with support from a number of prominent public figures including former prime ministers John Key, Helen Clark and Sir Geoffrey Palmer.

In the lead up to the election, the group spent $38,900 on 237 Facebook ads, suggesting a more granular campaign than the one carried out by Risky Law. Yes for Compassion’s campaign also had the benefit of being much more positive – its ads stressed the benefits the legislation would have (or would’ve had) for both families and individuals. For example, Heather, whose husband took his own life because of the “unbearable pain” caused by liver cancer, frequently features in the group’s advertising. The campaign also made use of the “yes” campaign’s numerous high profile endorsements with ads quoting politicians from both Labour and National

In addition to its Facebook spend, Yes for Compassion was one of just four referendum-related groups to advertise on Google, investing $12,000 into 23 ads – a combination of paid search results and YouTube commercials. In total, the group spent $50,900 on online ads. 

Yes for Compassion weekly ad spend on Google from August to October

Key takeaways

With pro-cannabis and anti-euthanasia groups outspending their counterparts on Google and Facebook, it’s clear that those on the backfoot of the referendums’ expected results made much more of a concerted effort (at least financially) to sway voters in their favour. In total, groups who lobbied for a yes vote on cannabis spent $154,600 on online advertising while just $31,200 was spent by their opposition. Groups who lobbied for a no vote on assisted dying spent $144,300 while just $50,900 was spent by the yes campaign. 

Six-figure spending from those in favour of the cannabis legislation seems indicative of the uphill battle the yes vote was forced to climb in order to catch up with the more visceral campaign waged by the opposition. In fact, the no campaign was criticised by cannabis researcher Professor Joseph Boden for creating “a field of misinformation” which made it difficult for to voters to discern what was right and wrong. In end, however, it was too much of a hill for the yes vote to surmount – the final results favoured the no vote by 2.3%.

Sensationalism characterised much of the no campaign for assisted dying with dramatised portrayals and sometimes misleading statements used in ads in order to elicit an emotional response. The campaign also clocked up a record number of transgressions with Facebook and Google removing dozens of ads over the roughly three month period. Ultimately though, their efforts to sway the vote failed: 31.4% more New Zealanders voted to legalise assisted dying which will come into effect from next year.

Read more: NZ’s election, online: What did each party spend – and how effective was it?