As Wellington City Council prepared for its final vote on whether to sell its shares in Wellington Airport, councillors clashed with the mayor and put their relationship with mana whenua at risk. And still, the outcome was anyone’s guess.

In the final instalment of a three-part series running this week, Oliver Neas explores the dramatic conflict and behind-the-scenes dealmaking that shaped the Wellington Airport saga. You can read part one here and part two here. 

Nīkau Wi Neera couldn’t sleep. There were no good options. He could betray his principles or disenfranchise his own iwi. “I thought I was going to be the first Māori ward councillor and the Māori ward councillor that blew up the relationship with iwi,” he says. 

The problem had started with a breakthrough. 

For months, Wi Neera and his allies had been trying to secure a second vote on the sale of the council’s shares in Wellington Airport, knowing that a majority of councillors now opposed it. But at every turn they had been set back by bureaucratic obstacles. Then finally, in early August, the door opened. There it was: a notice of revocation, signed by a majority of councillors, revoking the decision to sell the shares. 

The problem was it didn’t work. As council staff explained, the decision to include the airport sale in the long-term plan had been made by the council’s subsidiary long-term planning committee. The council could accept or reject that decision, but it couldn’t undo it. And because the long-term plan had now been approved, the only way to change it was to follow a formal amendment process involving further public consultation. 

Wi Neera’s colleague Nureddin Abdurahman tried a workaround, rewording the notice to propose that the council “commence a process to halt the sale”. But this was too ambiguous, the lawyers advised. Eventually, after discussions with officials, new wording was agreed. The new notice proposed that council “commence a process” to amend the long term plan “with Council’s objective being No Sale”. It was more complicated than what anyone wanted, but at least officials said it would work. When this latest iteration came through, Wi Neera didn’t look at it closely. “I just thought, ‘this is another attempt that will probably get shut down. I’ll put my name to it.’”

On September 5, the morning after the new notice was filed, an email came through from the council’s in-house lawyer. She was passing on a message from the council’s two mana whenua representatives, or pouiwi, Liz Kelly of Ngāti Toa and Holden Hohaia of Taranaki Whānui. They had a serious issue with what was proposed. 

There were four clauses in the notice of motion. One of them proposed that the amended plan be prepared by the council, not by the long-term plan committee. The effect was to exclude the pouiwi, who sit only on the committee and not council, from the entire process – which included much more than the airport sale. As Hohaia put it to The Post, councillors were “attempting to exclude mana whenua from making decisions”.

Wi Neera hadn’t foreseen this when he signed the notice. As he saw it, as a matter of law, “the council alone can sell a strategic asset, therefore any vote would have been at council anyway.” But he still wanted mana whenua involved in the process – back in June, he had tried unsuccessfully to get another vote at the committee level, precisely because he wanted to include the pouiwi. Similarly, Abdurahman’s initial draft of the notice had proposed to suspend the council’s delegation to the committee only for “further decisions on the sale of the airport shares”. But on the recommendation of staff, the suspension had been broadened to cover all work on the amended long-term plan. This was the notice that Wi Neera and others had signed. “We messed up and didn’t do our due diligence on the exact wording. I’m going to own that. I did sign on to something that had one clause in it that would have disenfranchised mana whenua,” Wi Neera says.

Wi Neera didn’t see the issue as a “zero sum” choice between his commitment to public ownership and Te Tiriti. After all, he had been elected to represent the Te-Whanganui-a-Tara Māori ward as a leftist opposed to privatisation. These dual commitments had guided him as he had navigated the airport issue – initially opposing the sale, before supporting it when he learnt iwi might buy the shares, before then changing his mind again when he realised that prospect was unlikely. 

As soon as the matter was raised, Wi Neera knew there was a big problem. It had nothing to do with the airport. It was that they had proactively asserted the council’s power over its Treaty partner. 

He thought he could bring everyone affected together to resolve the issue. He and Abdurahman wanted to reword the notice to avoid any suggestion of disenfranchisement. But the issue was spiralling fast, with the mayor publicly condemning the anti-sale group for damaging the council’s relationship with mana whenua just “to achieve a certain political outcome”. 

Abdurahman struck back, saying the mayor’s office was “weaponising” the issue for “political gain” to shift the discussion away from privatisation. To his dismay, some right-wing councillors wanted to lean into this framing and “play dirty politics to fight the mana whenua”, as he put it. Abdurahman begged them not to get involved. But he was quickly becoming isolated from his colleagues on the left. “They were not talking to me; they excluded me. That was very difficult. But I said, ‘No, I am OK, when it comes to my values, to stand alone.’” 

But Abdurahman couldn’t stop the airport sale by standing alone. He needed Wi Neera, urging him to hold the line. “You know me, when I go home today, I will sleep knowing I’m not doing this cynically to exclude mana whenua,” he told Wi Neera in a last-minute plea. But there was much more at stake than the airport alone. 

Iwi representatives had written to senior figures in the Labour and Green parties, prompting a senior Green staffer to call Wi Neera, asking him to explain. Mana whenua threatened to withdraw from the partnership with the council unless the notice was withdrawn in its entirety. Wi Neera was hearing the same message from closer to home. “My relations told me loud and clear that this has to be withdrawn. I took a long hard look at myself, I went to meet with my chief, and I was like, all right, this has to go,” he said.

Two weeks after he signed the notice of motion, Wi Neera announced his about-turn on Instagram. “I am committed to the constitutional document of our nation and for Māori to have a voice at the decision-making table. For this reason, I cannot support any notice of motion which would jeopardise our mana whenua partners’ rights to govern with us.” 

But the only person who could revoke the notice was Abdurahman, as mover of the motion. He had signalled he would ask councillors not to support the problematic disenfranchising clause, but he refused to withdraw the notice entirely. Whether Wi Neera liked it or not, the motion would be put to a vote on October 10.

Wi Neera had tried his best to get it withdrawn, but he failed. As he saw it, he had three options: “Abstain, look like a coward or sneaky; vote against this motion and betray my principles of public ownership and look like a turbo hypocrite and someone who doesn’t keep his word and breaks election promises; or I can vote for it, and I can seem as if I’m endorsing a process that local iwi have called racist.

“What do you do in that situation?” 

Winning and losing

At the back of the council chamber, among the packed public gallery, the Unions Wellington crew had no idea which way Wi Neera would go. 

It had been nearly a year since the meeting at Trades Hall when the campaign to stop the airport sale was born. The activists at that meeting couldn’t have foreseen how big the issue would become, reconfiguring political alliances and leading now to an extraordinary moment: a vote on whether to undo the council’s entire long-term plan, just three months after it had passed. 

Sabina Rizos-Shaw, Ashok Jacob and Finn Cordwell could claim some responsibility for what was unfolding. They had collected signatures, met with councillors, written letters and op-eds, made phone calls, surveyed residents, given media interviews, prepared submissions, and made signs, badges and T-shirts. Most importantly, they got people to show up. Back in April, more than 150 had turned out to the public forum on a Wednesday night. Dozens had shown up to submit against the sale and to attend key council meetings in May and June. The crowd that now packed the public gallery and a separate overflow room was the biggest the council had seen since the 1990s. There were another 2,500 people watching on the livestream. 

These mobilisations weren’t purely symbolic. Their purpose was to show decision-makers that this issue was deeply felt, to hold them accountable to their election promises, and to give them confidence that the public backed them to oppose the sale. There had been a healthy dose of luck along the way – including some questionable political judgement from the mayor’s team and some convenient political opportunism from rightwing councillors. But without the public turnout, “I don’t think we would have been able to crystallise our support with the leftwing block,” Cordwell says.

Nīkau Wi Neera was one of those leftwing councillors who the Unions Wellington crew had supported and cajoled. They knew he was under pressure, but they had no idea how much. His vote was crucial. Was he now about to let the sale through? “I was very stressed,” Cordwell says. “I was relatively confident going into the meeting that Nīkau was going to go the right way – until he started speaking.”

Wi Neera was standing before his colleagues, dressed in a black three-piece suit. He looked down at the page of notes in his hand and began his speech. 

“It is with a lot of pain that I observe who is not in the room today. My iwi is not in the room, and part of the responsibility for that fact lies with me,” he began. “If we are to win on this issue – and I believe that we will and we must – it becomes us to win on values. There is a right way to win and there is a wrong way to win. I feel that the bringing of this motion to council with clause three, with its disenfranchising implications for our Tākai Here partners, is the wrong way to win.

“If I could characterise the process with a single word, it would be misunderstanding. Crossed wires, people not picking up the phone, emails shooting back and forth without an appropriate CC. So many miscommunications at every step of the process, which could have been solved by concerned parties simply getting in a room together. As Māori ward councillor, I represent the bridge between the institution and tangata whenua. Therefore, the responsibility to facilitate this coming together ought to have been mine, and I have failed.

“All I can really do at this point is take responsibility for these failings and – if the motion is indeed put, and I fear it will be – apply my best judgment to the words that are put on the paper before us… I will leave it to the mover in the meeting to make the next steps.”

Attention turned to Abdurahman. Would he withdraw the motion? The mayor asked if he needed an adjournment. Abdurahman shook his head. The vote would go ahead. Wi Neera asked for a separate vote on clause three and urged his fellow councillors to vote it down. It was unanimous, 0-16. Then, they turned to the main vote. The notice of motion. Councillors were reminded to vote “yes” to keep the airport and rewrite the long-term plan, or “no” to sell the airport and keep the plan. 

Seated among a sea of supporters, his heart pounding, Cordwell watched as, one by one, the councillors’ names turned blue on the overheard screen, indicating they had cast their votes. Then, in an instant, the results appeared. Applause broke out in the public gallery. Nine votes to seven – they had done it. “I looked and it flashed on the screen, and I looked across at Ashok, and then I looked behind me at our supporters,” says Cordwell. “And I finally realised, ‘Jesus, has this actually just passed?’”

The airport would not be sold, and mana whenua would remain part of the amendment process. The Unions Wellington crew were ecstatic. News soon filtered through from the mayor’s office: Whanau wouldn’t be pushing a sale any further. Finally, it was over. 

But as the crowd dissipated, and the Unions Wellington crew and their supporters drifted down to the pub, Wi Neera didn’t feel so good. In casting his vote to unwind the sale, he had stood apart from his Green council colleagues. He felt gutted. “I think there are lots of people at the party who want to kick me out, to be frank, which is sad, and it makes me feel very insecure. This movement that I feel like I’ve given so much of myself to now doesn’t want any part of me,” he says. “It’s weird that winning is worse than losing. You wouldn’t believe the political capital I had when we lost [in May] – I was this guy who had heroically gone down trying to stop privatisation. It’s almost like the left doesn’t want to win. They just want to lose with mana.”

Postscript

Two weeks later, local government minister Simeon Brown announced plans to appoint a Crown observer to oversee Wellington City Council. 

To some, it was a vindication of officials’ warnings and an indictment of those who had put “political theatre” above responsible governance. Others pointed the finger at the mayor, who had held herself up as a builder of bridges but mainly just burned them. The minister’s stated reason for intervening, however, was only partly about the airport drama. At the heart of it was the council’s decision to rely on rates rather than debt to fund water infrastructure that meant it was “front-loading costs on current ratepayers”. Legally speaking, it wasn’t clear intervention was warranted. “If this low bar is applied in the future, the government’s going to be sacking councils all over the country over the next year or so,” law professor Dean Knight warned.

As councillors scrambled to hash out an amended long-term plan, a familiar narrative was emerging: without the airport sale, significant cuts were unavoidable. It was a cruel logic, symptomatic of a conundrum facing councils nationwide as the insurance giants retreated and central government did little to help. Sell your assets so you can spend down the proceeds when disaster inevitably strikes, or cut spending so the auditors let you borrow more. Privatisation or austerity. 

In fact, the council did have options – it could assume more risk, increase rates, borrow more, or sell something else – although these all had trade-offs, some unpalatable. And councillors were once again questioning the assumptions underpinning the advice after it emerged that the council’s insurance shortfall was $800 million less than previously thought. To Abdurahman, it was more evidence that councillors were “threatened throughout the airport sale based on figures that were wrong”. 

Months earlier, councillor Tim Brown had accused the Unions Wellington crew of “chasing Roger Douglas’s ghost”. In a sense, he was right. If you took the airport sale as a discrete policy decision at a single moment in time, it could be hard to see what the big deal was. After all, this was about a minority shareholding of a for-profit company. But the Unions Wellington crew was looking at it from a different angle, seeing this moment as part of a decades-long process that had fundamentally reshaped life in New Zealand. This was about more than the airport; it was about the erosion of public control, the gradual siphoning of community wealth to private interests, and the diminishing ability of public bodies to enact the public will. 

Turning the page on that chapter of history was about more than one campaign. It would be the work of lifetimes. But if the three young unionists had done anything, it was to show that it was possible to win. The lesson they took from it all was this: in Rizos-Shaw’s words, “There has never been a mandate to sell public assets in Aotearoa, and there continues to not be one.”  

The mayor’s office declined to be interviewed for this article or to answer specific questions. Separately, the Green Party provided the following comment: “Green-endorsed councillors facing difficult decisions regarding airport shares have been open with the party membership in Wellington about how complicated the situation is. Party members and supporters have expressed a range of views for and against the sale of airport shares to create a perpetual investment fund. Fundamentally, central government needs to come to the table with better funding and financing options for local councils to deal with insurance risks. Discussions have been had about how the party can support councillors to interpret and apply manifesto commitments in complicated situations and these discussions are ongoing. The party aims to support councillors to exercise their best judgment based on Green values and the information they have in front of them.”

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Covid-19 response has released its first report after months of assessing evidence and meeting with the public.

At 730 pages, the report outlines the government’s preparedness, response, communication and approaches to Covid-19 and the impacts they had on New Zealanders. 

New Zealand had no ‘plan b’ beyond elimination

The inquiry found that New Zealand was better prepared than many other countries for a pandemic, though overall preparedness around the globe was weak. 

New Zealand had a well-established civil defence and emergency management system in place but it was one designed to be implemented at a regional level and for short periods of time, for example in response to an earthquake or other natural disasters, rather than to a years-long pandemic. 

New Zealand had a pandemic plan (The New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan 2017) that was useful in the early stages of the pandemic, particularly the “keep it out” and “stamp it out” phases, but again, it was not designed to be adapted over time as the government’s response evolved. Short-term effectiveness and long-term fraying were a theme in the report.

Existing health pressures

New Zealand had a number of existing health system concerns before Covid-19 arrived, including inequities in health outcomes (particularly for Māori and Pacific people) and workforce capacity. Such concerns were factored in when adopting an elimination strategy and that strategy was effective in preventing health system overwhelm.

World class communication (at first)

The early Unite Against Covid-19 communication campaign and the 1pm daily briefings were highly effective, found the inquiry. The daily briefings were “the most praised aspect of the communications response in the public submissions to the inquiry and were frequently characterised as informative and reassuring”.

But while early communications around elimination were best in class, even elements celebrated early in the response eventually became the focus of interrogation and distrust. For example, the presence of prime minister Jacinda Ardern in the daily briefings was welcomed in the beginning and her communication skills praised, but was later viewed to be “politicising” a health issue by some submitters. Similarly, Ardern saying that the government was the “single source of truth” was reassuring and effective as a tool against Covid-19 misinformation at the beginning of the pandemic but later became a frequent reference for those lacking trust in the government’s response and communications.

On the practical side, the inquiry noted that “transitions from one strategy to the next were fuzzy and not always well-signalled”. The inquiry found it difficult to identify when exactly New Zealand’s elimination strategy began and when it ended, and noted that was because it was never adequately communicated at the time.

Reports in April and December 2020 suggest the government plan was to stick with an elimination strategy until something close to herd immunity was achieved (90% vaccination levels across all population groups). 

No long-term strategising

The report identifies the 2021 Delta outbreak as a crucial turning point in both the government response and New Zealanders’ trust and buy-in to that response. With herd immunity not yet achieved and the elimination strategy failing to stamp out Delta in Auckland, the inquiry found that there was no “plan b” in New Zealand’s official response, and that government agencies failed to look at long-term strategy while dealing with the day-to-day of the early response.

From the report: “The ‘breathing room’ created by the successful elimination of community transmission between June 2020 to August 2021 was in our view not used to best effect. The opportunity was missed to review the ongoing optimisation, then exit, of the elimination strategy, consider adaptation for potential new virus scenarios and adequately prepare other response options for changes in circumstances (including the cumulative and shifting impacts across health, social, wellbeing and economic outcomes).”

This is not a unique assessment. Labour leader Chris Hipkins, the Covid-19 response minister at the time, told the inquiry as much. “There was no bump free pathway to get from elimination to life as normal – there was always going to be disruption on the way… We needed to have a group of people more removed and planning for the next steps – we had everyone focused on ‘right now’. We really needed to think beyond the horizon – we didn’t nail that.”

Community relationships with government agencies crucial to an effective response

The pandemic required a cross-agency all-of-government approach, and the inquiry found that where agencies had strong existing relationships with communities, there was higher trust and a speedier devolution of decision-making at the community level. It allowed for “locally-tailored solutions that are more effective than standard responses”. The report noted a number of instances where a lack of Māori and iwi advice was sought in drafting the response strategies. It recommended agency and community relationships be grown and maintained outside of an emergency response.

Contact tracing an area for improvement

While scaling up of testing and contact tracing efforts were “generally done well”, the report found it started from a low baseline and is something that should be built upon for future pandemic responses.

The cost of strict measures

The report found that New Zealand’s peak hospitalisation rates and Covid-19 deaths were lower than almost every other country in the OECD, but strict health measures meant more social isolation and distress particularly for those in hospital and aged care.

At the same time, the elimination strategy and caution around healthcare capacity meant “avoidable delays or omissions in [non Covid-19] healthcare, with ongoing consequences for the health of those affected”. Such delays and omissions resulted in lower childhood immunisations, reduced cancer screening rates and longer wait times for specialist care and planned surgery.

Traffic light system largely a bust

The traffic light system was New Zealand’s move away from an elimination strategy – the alert level system – and into a suppression/mitigation strategy. But the inquiry found this was never adequately communicated. Then-prime minister Jacinda Ardern hinted at a shift in approach on October 4, nearly two months into Auckland’s Delta lockdown, but “did not clearly identify the strategic goal that would replace elimination, though her description of ‘controlling the virus to the best of our ability’ is consistent with a suppression strategy,” said the report. 

“We heard about reluctance on the part of decision-makers to explicitly announce the end of the elimination strategy because of anticipated public fallout from the health impacts of Covid-19 becoming established.”

As a result, previously appreciated communication strategies like the 1pm briefings and calls to “be kind” became points of tension, especially for those living through the stricter restrictions of the response in Auckland. The blurring of communication compared to the early days of the response “had an unsettling impact on people, which was compounded by a rise of misinformation and disinformation (both about the virus itself and the government response)”.

Border closures the right call – but too slow

The report found that New Zealand’s swift action to close borders and implement managed isolation and quarantine (MIQ) was crucial in preventing large-scale community transmission. From March 2020 to mid-2022, these measures protected the country during the pre-vaccination phase, reducing the strain on the health system and enabling an elimination strategy that allowed many citizens to enjoy relative normalcy while other nations endured repeated lockdowns.

The establishment of the MIQ system, despite its ad-hoc nature, was a significant achievement, the report found. Within months, 32 facilities were operational, hosting 230,000 border arrivals and thousands of community cases over two years. For many, this response represented an impressive and coordinated effort to manage an unprecedented crisis.

The challenges: Human and operational costs

However, the inquiry highlighted the steep costs of these measures. Families were separated for years, unable to reunite for weddings, funerals, or even the final moments of loved ones’ lives. Stranded New Zealanders, many of whom described their lives as “in limbo,” were left navigating a deeply flawed MIQ booking system, often likened to a “cruel lottery”.

MIQ’s shortcomings were clear. The system struggled to prioritise travellers with urgent or compassionate needs, as its strict criteria excluded many from critical exemptions. Public submissions revealed stories of missed farewells and mounting financial and emotional tolls. Staffing challenges and the unsuitability of hotel facilities for large-scale quarantine also highlighted the operational difficulties of adapting existing infrastructure for pandemic use.

A majority of decisions were often being made before operational capacity had been ensured. Policies were implemented with limited consultation, leaving frontline agencies and private sector stakeholders scrambling to adapt. The split governance between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) led to inefficiencies and frustrations, particularly as MIQ transitioned to accommodate community cases during the Delta outbreak.

Operational hurdles

MIQ’s rapid implementation, while impressive, faced significant logistical issues. Firstly, demand outstripped capacity. The number of New Zealanders overseas at the time – 80,000 temporarily abroad and 800,000 permanent expatriates – made predicting demand nearly impossible. Irregular flight patterns and cancellations further complicated planning.

The allocation of MIQ spaces to high-profile individuals, including athletes and performers, raised concerns about fairness. Public submissions revealed anger over the perceived preferential treatment of certain groups while others remained stranded.

Human and social costs

MIQ, though effective, exacted a steep toll on individuals and families. Families were separated for prolonged periods and the psychological impact of being unable to return home was severe for many.

Despite these challenges, MIQ undeniably played a vital role in New Zealand’s pandemic response. By June 2022, approximately 230,000 arrivals had passed through MIQ, preventing countless potential infections and buying valuable time to prepare for the vaccine rollout.

Looking ahead

The inquiry’s findings emphasised the need for better preparedness and flexibility in future pandemics. Key recommendations include:

1. Rapid initial implementation: Swifter border closures and quarantine measures are essential to prevent viral entry.
2. Flexibility and compassion: Systems must better account for individual and compassionate circumstances, ensuring equitable treatment.
3. Develop purpose-built quarantine facilities: The use of hotels, while convenient, revealed significant limitations. Purpose-built facilities, similar to Australia’s Howard Springs, would provide better infection control, ventilation, and accommodation for diverse needs.
4. Transparency and fairness: Allocation systems must be clear and equitable to avoid perceptions of favouritism.
5. Establish clear governance structures: A centralised and integrated pandemic response structure would streamline decision-making, improve coordination, and ensure operational readiness across agencies and sectors.
6. Enhance MIQ systems: Future isolation systems must balance speed with equity. A prioritisation framework that considers humanitarian needs, combined with real-time human support (like helplines), would lessen the distress experienced by travelers.
7. Expand quarantine options: A more flexible range of isolation measures, including home quarantine and smaller-scale facilities, would allow for a tailored approach, mitigating the economic and social impacts of large-scale restrictions.
8. Strengthen pandemic preparedness: Regularly updated pandemic plans that consider non-influenza scenarios, pre-arranged contracts for quarantine facilities, and robust stockpiles of critical resources will enhance readiness for future crises.

Lockdowns successful, but at a cost

First, a reminder. The first national lockdown (alert levels three and four) occurred between March and May 2020 and lasted seven weeks. Then there was a series of brief level three lockdowns in Auckland during late 2020 and early 2021, each lasting from a few days to a few weeks. In the second half of 2021 the Delta variant was detected in the community and a lockdown (alert levels three and four) followed. It lasted three weeks for most of the country, but continued for months in Auckland. There were shorter regional lockdowns in Northland and Waikato. In December 2021 the traffic light system was implemented, leaving alert levels behind.

Overall the report found that lockdowns were successful as a public health measure. In short, “lockdown conditions were a key component in the success in eliminating transmission of the virus in Aotearoa New Zealand”. The lockdowns in 2020 and 2021 were effective in achieving and maintaining the elimination strategy. Compared to other countries, our lockdowns were strict but short.

One key to the success of lockdowns was social cohesion and trust in government. These conditions supported high compliance, greater social licence for action and effective community-led responses. Many community structures including iwi, marae, sports clubs, churches and other groups provided significant leadership and support. They sourced kai, medicine, resources and other essential items, and distributed them to those who needed them. Within Pacific and Māori communities these groups were trusted sources of information, connected people to resources and advocated for the vulnerable. The groups that stepped up “undoubtedly alleviated some potential negative impacts of lockdowns”.

Digital access a key factor in lockdown success

Critical to the successful use of lockdowns was good digital access as work, education and socialising went online. However, there were key gaps in coverage, especially in rural areas. Other barriers were affordability of devices and connections, and lack of skills or knowledge. Students were less disrupted here than in most other OECD countries, but attendance and achievement still dropped, particularly for Māori and Pacific students, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and students in Auckland.

For many, working from home came with a set of challenges. The pandemic placed many with significant caring responsibilities (most often women) under considerable additional stress. The difficulties of juggling these competing demands, as well as the social disconnection of working from home, took a toll on many people’s mental health.

People in informal and precarious work were hit hard. This included people whose employment was too inconsistent to qualify for income support and workers whose employers didn’t apply for the wage subsidy but instead closed or laid off staff. The authors’ engagements with officials involved in designing the income protections and employment support suggested little consideration was given to these issues.

Remember the essential workers?

The report found that thanks to the half a million or so essential workers who regularly left home to work during alert level four, sufficient food supplies, functioning lifeline utilities, a sound financial sector, supply chains, health and emergency services, access to courts and public safety were fundamentally maintained. International supply chain congestion caused problems, but at a national level there were no shortages of food and essential goods. These workers faced abuse, anger, fear, discrimination or distress from the public and were at risk of exposure to the Covid-19 virus.

A theme in public submissions was that the designation of essential was confusing. One concern was that the designation undermined competition and disadvantaged smaller businesses – for example, by allowing major supermarkets to open but not small-scale food providers such as butchers.

By mid-October 2021 it was evident the Delta outbreak would not be easily eliminated. Focus shifted to maximising vaccine uptake in order to allow restrictions to be loosened. Justification for lockdowns shifted to protecting vulnerable groups from the severe impacts of Covid-19 infection, but as noted above, this shift (and most decisions at this time) was not well-communicated to the public. The social license of the government was eroding. In public submissions to the enquiry, there was widespread criticism of the duration of the Auckland lockdown.

The report found that despite the criticism, the duration was justified. The government allowed more time for Māori and Pacific communities to reach higher levels of vaccination, and so have greater protection against the virus. 

However, the report notes that lockdowns in Australia (Victoria and New South Wales) ended at lower vaccination coverage levels without any associated increase in case numbers, and argues that in a future pandemic this should be considered. The report also notes that some Pacific countries avoided the need for lockdowns by closing their borders, suggesting Aotearoa could benefit from earlier border restrictions in a future pandemic.

New Zealand relied on lockdowns because the public health system needed significant strengthening of capacity and capability. But had there been greater investment before Covid-19 arrived, there may have been more options to limit its spread, says the report.

Faster vaccine rollout in vulnerable communities would’ve saved lives

Part seven of the inquiry assesses the procurement and rollout of and response to vaccination against Covid-19, as well as hesitancy to the vaccine and misinformation. Though the report stated that, alongside the elimination strategy, vaccinations were integral to the effectiveness of Aotearoa’s Covid-19 response, opportunities to reach vulnerable populations were missed and public submissions said they were let down by government communications.

The inquiry found that though New Zealand was later than other countries to provide vaccines, uptake was high and swift with more than 80% of New Zealanders having received two doses of the vaccine by the end of 2021. An estimated 6,500 lives were saved and 45,000 hospitalisations were prevented by the inoculations.

The procurement process was also found to be effective. Aotearoa had invested in several vaccine sources, which the report stated reflected a well-judged policy with the understanding that one in five contenders result in an effective vaccine. The report also found the Pfizer vaccine underwent an appropriate full independent assessment and received provisional approval by Medsafe.

Equity over equality

The rollout – the biggest immunisation campaign in Aotearoa’s history – was found to have been successful in reaching a large population of New Zealanders, though opportunities were missed to reach vulnerable groups and ensure equity. Though Māori and Pasifika health providers were found to be particularly effective in the rollout and reaching their own communities, providers felt frustrated by missed opportunities to vaccinate earlier and further its effectiveness. 

“[Pacific community providers] knew the models that were going to work… family-centred, drive-throughs, community pop-ups and outreach… these were the approaches that we put forward,” one community leader told the report. “But they were pushed back because the focus was on setting up fixed vaccination sites.” A faster rollout for these communities would have resulted in fewer hospitalisations and deaths, and likely shortened the final Auckland lockdown, the report found.

Vaccine hesitancy and misinformation

Vaccine hesitancy, aggravated by misinformation, was also found to have impacted the rollout, especially among young and/or rural New Zealanders and Māori and Pasifika. Several stakeholders told the report that a lower vaccine uptake among young people was at least partially caused by greater exposure to misinformation, an issue with a knock-on effect on Māori and Pasifika given their more youthful community make-up and historical low trust of mainstream health providers.

Hesitancy was also found to be linked with the fact that being immunised is not without risk. The report stated that these risks are better understood where vaccines have long been used, but due to the newness of the Covid-19, adverse affects and risks would not be fully understood until larger groups of the population were immunised. This may have created the impression that information was being withheld from the public by experts and stronger processes for clearer communication are recommended for future pandemics.

Incentives given to encourage vaccine uptake, such as free KFC or shopping vouchers, were found to be effective but also challenge the rollout as they raised ethical issues. The report suggested vaccine hesitancy be addressed at the source within communities in future, and that incentives should be given with caution. One Māori leader told the inqiury that incentives had been described as “bribes”, though he saw this as “manaakitanga”.

Mixed reviews on the rollout

Public submissions shared with the inquiry found a varied response to vaccination; some said they were happy with the speed in which the government made vaccines available and the quality provided, and that the vaccine was effective in protecting vulnerable communities. Some believed that, for future pandemics, the government should again let other countries facing a more serious situation have first access to the vaccine.

However, the report notes that “far more” submissions it received were critical of the rollout, government messaging around the vaccine and vaccine-related restrictions. The inquiry was informed by submitters that the vaccine rollout was too slow and early access should have been allowed for more people, and that many believed the vaccine passes were unnecessary as vaccination should have been sufficient protection. Some said they could not give informed consent because there was not enough information about the vaccine, while others who had experienced negative effects to vaccinations felt their concerns were ignored.

Mandates must be introduced ‘very cautiously’

In a series of interviews this morning, inquiry chair Tony Blakely emphasised the mandate question more than any, noting, for example, on RNZ: “I think we’ve all learnt that [introducing vaccine mandates] has to be done very cautiously. Even if the majority of the population are in the mood, in the drive, of the view that it should be happening, the unintended consequences or, some would say, perfectly anticipatable consequences for the minority are major.”

That is underlined at the outset in the Royal Commission report. “Whatever satisfaction we draw from the fact that Aotearoa New Zealand emerged from the pandemic in considerably better shape than many other countries, we cannot look away from the undeniable harm New Zealand sustained,” write the authors in the foreword. “Contentious public health measures like vaccine mandates wore away at what had initially been a united wall of public support for the pandemic response; along with the rising tide of misinformation and disinformation, this created social fissures that have not entirely been repaired.”

The report applies a broad definition of mandates, or “mandatory measures”, whereby there is a compulsion to test, contact trace, wear a mask, undergo vaccination or prove vaccination status to enter a workplace or other premises. Submissions confirmed such measures “were among the most controversial aspects of the pandemic experience”. The pushback to many of those measures “dovetailed with broader anti-vaccine and anti-government sentiments, prompted in part by rising levels of misinformation and disinformation, and the proliferation of Covid-19 related conspiracy theories on social media.” 

Reassurances and tensions

For some, vaccine requirements were reassuring, delivering confidence in workplaces and social engagement, but they “had wider social and economic consequences”, the commission concluded. Those included introducing tension and stigma in some workplaces, exacerbating shortages in some sectors. 

The requirements “reduced trust in government for some and probably contributed to lower uptake of other vaccines (such as childhood immunisations) in some communities, particularly among Māori.” With the benefit of hindsight, “vaccine mandates had substantial, long-lasting impacts that would need to be taken into account in any future decisions around their use in a pandemic response”. The potential impact on social cohesion should be an important consideration in responses to future pandemics, the commission found. 

The most visible resistance took shape in the 28-day occupation of parliament grounds in 2022. The protest, driven by mandates among other things, “represented the most significant civil unrest in Aotearoa New Zealand for some time. It is likely to have far-reaching social consequences.”

As part of preparing for future similar challenges, the Ministry of Health should map out the circumstances in which vaccine mandates could be called upon again, along with “key considerations for how the negative impacts of the requirements might be mitigated”.

The second phase of the inquiry will further investigate government decisions around mandates. 

Economic and social impacts were uneven

While New Zealand’s strict public health response was appropriate, “it has left a long shadow on the economy and society – a phenomenon that is certainly not peculiar to Aotearoa New Zealand nor attributable solely to our domestic policy responses,” says the report.

The government’s initial economic response earns praise, with the report saying it was comprehensive, generous and met its immediate aims. New Zealand maintained a relatively stable economic position, prevented large scale unemployment, supported people’s incomes, and the economy rebounded very fast in 2020 and 2021, it says.

The wage subsidy scheme – at $18 billion in total, the largest single item of expenditure during the response – comes in for particular praise: “Implementing such a wide-reaching wage subsidy in a short period of time in March 2020, under extremely testing circumstances, was a great achievement,” says the report.

But there was a flipside. “The generosity of the initial response and the length of time it continued has slowed Aotearoa New Zealand’s subsequent economic recovery, and the effects continue to be felt.

“As the pandemic evolved, all of the information and tools available to authorities were not used to achieve the right balance between avoiding deflation (and possible financial crisis) and economic depression in the short term and limiting the extent of the unavoidable price that is paid in terms of inflation, debt and lost productivity in the medium to long term.” 

The economy has experienced many enduring post-pandemic effects, says the report, including “on output and productivity, employment and migration, cost of living/inflation, the housing market, government debt and delays in much-needed infrastructure investments”.

The report criticises a lack of “active coordination of monetary and fiscal policy, in the sense of having a broad common understanding of how they might interact with each other. Such an understanding can matter enormously in a crisis, where matters are evolving fast.” While the government’s balance sheet is healthier than most other countries, concerns have been raised about the fast and significant rise in net government debt, the report added.

Social impacts felt more by vulnerable communities

The social impacts of the pandemic were incredibly varied among New Zealanders, which exacerbated pre-existing issues such as unaffordable housing, mental health issues and inequities in minority groups. Public submissions shared with the inquiry showed many New Zealanders were able to support one another through the pandemic, while others said their perceptions and lifestyles drastically changed.

Submitters noted that lockdowns in particular had a negative impact on mental health and wellbeing, which was often exacerbated by restrictions on social restrictions. Some told the Inquiry they believed rules could have been more flexible to accommodate individuals needing care and support, or for those wanting to see a sick or dying loved one, or wanting to attend a funeral and tangi. Not having flexibility in the latter instances worsened the grieving process for many New Zealanders.

During the pandemic, the need for various social support systems covering food grants, housing support, family violence support, mental health and addiction support and support in meeting basic needs or helping individuals and families isolate increased. The report recognised that groups facing pre-existing disadvantages were disproportionately affected by the pandemic, and this made up a significant portion of the population (pre-pandemic, this included 697,000 New Zealanders).

Between March 2020 and June 2023, $2.4b was spent to support community responses, $3.3b on additional benefits to individuals and households, and $18b to support the wage subsidy scheme from the Covid-19 Response and Recovery Fund. The report stated the initial response in setting up effective social services was “patchy and focused on immediate priorities”. This approach changed over the following months, to a more collaborative system between government, iwi and community partners. As noted above, the inquiry reiterated the need for central government to build trust and relationships with communities and their local providers outside of emergency situations.

South Auckland as a scapegoat

Social issues were felt especially hard in South Auckland, an area the report said was disproportionately affected by continuous outbreaks and lockdown restrictions given its large number of essential workers, many of whom worked within or near Auckland Airport. These communities had high levels of anxiety, enough to stop older residents from leaving their homes and families keeping children from school.

South Auckland community providers told the inquiry the Covid-19 response failed to recognise the possibility of negative consequences for the communities. Large families with shared resources were impacted by public health messaging around “bubbles” and sharing food. The report also stated disabled children were left without care and support.

The report stated that “none of these challenges were unique to South Auckland, but they appear to have been particularly concentrated there”. For this reason, the area also gained a negative reputation for being a Covid-19 hot spot, which community leaders said was also based on misconceptions around the locals, who said they believed other areas of New Zealand facing outbreaks did not receive the same level of media coverage.

The full impacts of Covid-19 will be intergenerational

The report noted that many New Zealanders continue to struggle with the mental and physical effects of Covid-19, from Long Covid to relationship breakdowns and financial ruin. These impacts will not be resolved anytime soon and may prove to have consequences for New Zealand for generations to come.