Wayne Brown, Auckland’s invisible mayor. (Image: Toby Morris)
Wayne Brown, Auckland’s invisible mayor. (Image: Toby Morris)

OPINIONPoliticsApril 13, 2023

And so we ask again: Where is Wayne Brown?

Wayne Brown, Auckland’s invisible mayor. (Image: Toby Morris)
Wayne Brown, Auckland’s invisible mayor. (Image: Toby Morris)

The mayor has accepted the findings of the Bush review into the flood response, including criticisms of his lack of visible leadership. And yet, once again, the mayor is invisible, writes Toby Manhire.

In the six months since he became the mayor of Auckland, Wayne Brown has generated enough colourful language to fill a small paperback of quotations – a feat all the more amazing given how very few interviews he’s undertaken. The one that sticks in the mind, however, above the drongos and cusses and threats to “go feral”, came in a strange, hastily put together press conference just before midnight on January 27, at a time when much of the city was coming to terms with the horrific flooding unleashed by an “atmospheric river” that had engulfed properties and already claimed at least one life. It was “not my job”, protested the mayor, “to rush out with buckets”. 

True, sure, yes. There is no line in the mayoral job description about rushing out with buckets. But it seemed just about the most unleaderly thing anyone could say at such a moment. A mayor rushing anywhere, buckets or not, would have been something. Visible, active, engaged – leading from the front. But until that press conference, he was essentially nowhere to be seen. As homes were flooded, as busses floated down streets, The Spinoff’s editor wrote that night: Where is Wayne Brown?

Wayne Brown signing the state of emergency declaration, in a photograph provided by the mayor’s office.

The next hours and days weren’t much better. In one of only a few interviews, with Kim Hill on RNZ the next morning, Brown defended his response and decided to say: “It will be interesting to see just how well prepared Wellington is when the earthquake strikes.” Had text alerts been sent to Auckland residents? He didn’t know. Was water safe to drink? Don’t know. I mean, be grumpy, by all means, but at least channel it to demand answers. He seemed so determinedly incurious. 

The next day, Brown appeared with Chris Hipkins at a press conference that would have been hilarious had it not been for the circumstances. After seething at the media in what amounted to an extended “not my fault” around the timing of an emergency declaration and the response as a whole, he was physically dragged away by Desley Simpson, who has looked consistently more mayoral than the man to whom she is deputy. 

The January 28 press conference

“Almost all respondents to this review felt that public messaging over the first 48 hours of the emergency was inadequate,” was the assessment of the Mike Bush led review into the flood response, published yesterday afternoon. “Multiple channels were not well deployed, timeliness was poor and communications content was light … Aucklanders expected and needed clear and regular messaging, delivered with empathy via multiple channels, to understand the seriousness of the event, to know where to go and how to get help, and to gain assurance that the crisis was being actively managed by their elected and professional leaders.”

(Empathy – or the lack of – is conspicuous in the report. The word appears five times. As another colleague put it, empathy is not so much a rare political superpower as “a necessary leadership skill”.)

In the most headmasterly manner imaginable, former police commissioner Bush (who rightly lauded the enormous, selfless efforts by so many involved in the response) laid out what added up to “system failure”. He said: “The issues of leadership exposed by this crisis must be addressed. Key leaders in Auckland City failed to appreciate the vital importance of visible leadership and frequent public communication during a time of crisis.” And: “Effective leadership in a crisis goes directly to public confidence in elected leaders, and thus to the overall health of our democratic institutions.”

It would be wrong and unfair to say this was all about Brown’s response. He was just the bit of the iceberg above the water line. The most serious findings of the Bush review describe a general underpreparedness – what is worse, a known underpreparedness – of the emergency management groups. There was a broad lack of coordination, with the overall emergency response in the immediate aftermath clearly much less than the sum of its parts. A few of those parts had a near farcical quality. Some processes were dysfunctional. The vast part of it pre-dates Brown, and – though it should be asked what his predecessor knew and did or didn’t do about it – Brown can’t be blamed for that. 

Brown is not being asked to take blame, however. He’s being asked to take responsibility. 

And isn’t that what we expect of our elected leaders? To take responsibility, to unite a team (rather than, say, denigrating them) and to hammer home that things must and will get, you know, fixed?

Wayne Brown inspects flood damage in Auckland (Photo: Lynn Grieveson/Getty Images)

It is to Brown’s credit, it is also true, that he commissioned the Bush review. And he did show contrition. In a statement that some unkindly joked appeared in the form of a hostage video, a week on from the deluge, Brown apologised, saying he “dropped the ball”. He reiterated that apology yesterday, accepting the recommendations of the Bush review, acknowledging he “should have been more assertive in demanding information, so that I could provide Aucklanders with public safety advice, practical support, and reassurance.” With an added flick of: “I assumed that the systems were better than they were.”

Brown said all that in a statement, however. While Bush fronted a press conference, there was no chance to ask questions of Brown, nor another who bears some responsibility, the departing CEO Jim Stabback. His statement appeared in the same release. Both should have fronted the press, but especially the elected mayor. Not for the sake of the media drongos themselves, to be clear, but because the public deserve to hear what their leaders say in response to questions about the systems over which they preside, and the decisions they took. After all, the Bush report did say that at such an important moment “senior leaders underestimated the importance of their visible leadership roles”. It pointedly noted the “vital importance of visible leadership”, and “the need to provide visible leadership front and centre”, and – well, you get the picture. 

With a heavy heart, then, we summon up the question once more. Where is Wayne Brown? We asked the mayor’s office whether the mayor would be giving interviews or fronting a press conference, but have yet to receive a reply.

‘If you regularly enjoy The Spinoff, and want it to continue, become a member today.’
Toby Manhire
— Editor-at-large
Keep going!
Some common phrases from a review into the emergency response.
Some common phrases from a review into the emergency response.

PoliticsApril 12, 2023

Damning review into Auckland flood response finds ‘system failure’

Some common phrases from a review into the emergency response.
Some common phrases from a review into the emergency response.

The long-awaited review into the emergency response during the January Auckland floods has been released today. Stewart Sowman-Lund dissects the key findings.

The review ordered into the emergency response to the Auckland anniversary weekend flood has been released this afternoon, concluding that the response was slow and inadequate from the top down, and placing much of the blame on a lack of communication between officials and the mayor’s office.

The report, headed by former police commissioner Mike Bush, was ordered swiftly in the wake of the January 27 floods that claimed four lives. It was expected to be completed by early March but was bumped out due to the impacts of Cyclone Gabrielle. It was seen as necessary owing to widespread public criticism that Auckland mayor Wayne Brown was slow to act on the night of the floods, when no emergency alert was issued and a state of emergency wasn’t publicly declared until past 10pm, hours after homes, workplaces and streets across parts of the supercity had already been submerged in rushing floodwaters. 

The 107-page report stated that a number of factors “aligned to create system failure” during the 12 hours of the initial emergency response. “Aucklanders did not receive the timely communications, leadership and practical support they had a right to expect in a crisis of this magnitude.”

A long list of “thematic findings” in the report’s summary describe how the Auckland Council’s emergency management system was “not prepared for an event of this magnitude and speed”, while “gaps in preparedness” were known to key council decision makers in advance. Senior leaders “underestimated the importance of their visible leadership roles” and there was a lack of “crisis leadership skills and operational experience” as well. 

Of the mayor’s actions on the night of January 27, the report determined that the mayor’s decision to order a state of emergency “could and should have been made earlier”. The report suggested the state of emergency should have been declared at 5.58pm – the time when fire and emergency was reporting “mass evacuations” and “additional weather warnings”. That would have been several hours before the mayor signed off the declaration at 9.27pm, which in turn was nearly an hour before the public was informed.

“A timely declaration during daylight hours, accompanied by an emergency mobile alert, would have assisted the operational response and increased public safety by ensuring that Aucklanders understood the seriousness of the event.”

Wayne Brown inspects flood damage in Auckland (Photo: Lynn Grieveson/Getty Images)

Emergency management leaders, council executives and the mayor’s office were also criticised for not having “fully appreciated the power of official public announcements, delivered with empathy, in providing reassurance, as well as practical information, to those impacted by frightening and dangerous events”.

There were also some communication issues that delayed the release of that emergency statement even further. “A completed declaration template was emailed to the mayor’s office at 9.25pm and signed by 9.27pm. The signed declaration was then provided by the mayor to the Public Information Manager (PIM) of AEM but was not posted until 10.17pm,” the report determined. 

“The delay appears to have been because communications staff were waiting for approval of the accompanying media advisory and a quote from the mayor. The mayor’s staff were not aware of this until 10.02pm. The statement was approved, and a quote provided by 10.07pm.”

The report does, however, acknowledged that the mayor did sign the emergency declaration “immediately” after he was informed of the need for it – backing up his public statements in the days following the flood.

Communications on the night between the mayor’s office, elected members, the chair of local Civil Defence committee, the executive team and emergency management “were disjointed and suboptimal”, the report stated, and they “relied too heavily on individual initiative – such as that shown by the director governance – rather than on predesigned and pretested protocols”.

People also appear to have relied on assumptions. “For example, council executives and AEM staff appeared to assume that the mayor already understood the Auckland emergency management model, the process for making a declaration and the roles of key personnel. The mayor assumed that AEM was working the event from a sophisticated physical command centre; that they would brief him as needed and that roles and accountabilities in a time of crisis were clear and well understood.”

The mayor had also reportedly not received formal advice on Auckland’s emergency operational plans ahead of the flooding and “nor did we come across any protocols or procedures that identified who was responsible for advising the mayor on [Civil Defence emergency management].” 

The report also highlighted a lack of advance preparedness within the council. There was no contingency plan for severe weather events, despite the ACDEM Group Plan being in force on the night of the floods. This documented noted that a contingency plan for flooding and a “super storm” was a “very high priority” for Auckland – but the report determined no contingency plan existed.

Officials were criticised for not working alongside Māori and Pasifika organisations, who mobilised on the ground “in spite of AEM rather than because of it”.

The report added: “This is in contrast to the approach taken in Northland, for example, where iwi/Māori regularly contribute to and review specific local response plans and where the use of marae as CDCs is standard.”

There are 17 key recommendations made by the report, including that a separate, urgent review be undertaken to examine Auckland Emergency Management’s “prevention, preparedness and planning” for future emergencies in Auckland. The emergency management structure within the council should also be clarified, in particular the operational relationships between key officials. There should also be a “more frequent schedule” of emergency management exercises and the induction process for a new mayor should include advice and briefing on both the emergency management system and how to “inform, advise, and provide assurance during emergency response”.

In a statement released alongside the report, mayor Brown accepted the findings and reiterated that he had “dropped the ball” during the floods. “The communications weren’t fast enough, and I was too slow to be seen. I stand by my previous apology to Aucklanders,” Brown said.

‘Like a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle, each member is vital to the whole picture. Join today.’
Calum Henderson
— Production editor

However, the mayor noted that the report confirmed he had signed the emergency declaration “immediately upon being advised of the need” for it. “I accept that I should have been more assertive in demanding information, so that I could provide Aucklanders with public safety advice, practical support, and reassurance. I assumed that the systems were better than they were.

“The preparation wasn’t good enough – that’s clear from the fact that some of the planned Civil Defence Centres flooded on the night which contributed to delays in establishing the sites. That just shouldn’t happen, and we need to make sure we can set-up those sites faster in future,” Brown said.

Auckland Council chief executive Jim Stabback said that he, the council’s executive leadership, and emergency management staff will consider the report’s findings, recommendations, and report back on an implementation plan.