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OPINIONPoliticsAugust 17, 2020

No, National, the caretaker convention doesn’t apply now – and nor should it

collins ardern parliament

Despite Judith Collins’ claim, the caretaker convention – the understanding that in certain circumstances significant governing decisions should have a parliamentary majority, or be consulted on by the opposition – does not apply in the pre-election period. And for some perfectly good reasons, writes law professor Claudia Geiringer.

In July 1984, the Muldoon government was defeated in a snap election. The next day, senior Reserve Bank officials advised an urgent currency devaluation in order to avoid a run on the dollar. Prime minister-in-waiting David Lange supported the move. Muldoon initially refused.

Muldoon’s senior cabinet ministers were appalled, and they staged an intervention. Deputy prime minister Jim McLay told Muldoon there was a constitutional convention requiring him to act on the advice of the incoming prime minister. As McLay later admitted, no such convention really existed. But Muldoon swallowed the bait, and backed down.

In that moment, New Zealand’s caretaker convention was born. A convention, after all, is just a constitutional practice that political actors observe because they believe its required of them. (They believe it, so it’s so.) The caretaker convention’s been observed ever since, and it’s now authoritatively recorded in the cabinet manual – a document that’s endorsed by each new government at the start of its term.

Robert Muldoon drunkenly announces the 1984 snap election. Deputy prime minster Jim McLay is behind him on the right (Screenshot: TVNZ Eyewitness News)

Fast forward 36 years and the caretaker convention’s back in the news. Last week, Judith Collins lambasted the government for failing to consult her before moving Auckland to alert level three. She invoked a constitutional convention that, she said, required proper input from the opposition on major decisions of national significance during the pre-election period.

This was pure fiction. As others have explained, the caretaker convention does not extend that far. New Zealand governments have never been required to consult with the opposition during the lead-up to (as opposed to directly after) an election.

But should they? Should this be treated – as was 1984 – as an opportunity for the caretaker convention to be reimagined?

The idea does have some superficial attraction. Both the United Kingdom and Australia have pre-election “purdah” periods of the kind Collins envisages. One justification for that approach is that every general election carries with it the possibility of a change of government. Another is that, once parliament’s been dissolved, the executive can no longer be held to account for its decisions in the normal manner.

This is a point on which reasonable people may choose to disagree. A pre-election consultation requirement has, however, some significant drawbacks. Ironically, they’re graphically illustrated by recent events.

Let me explain.

The big house.

The logic of the caretaker convention

We need to go back to basics. Under New Zealand’s democratic system, it’s critical that the head of state (in practice, her representative, the governor general) must always have an elected government to advise her. There must never be a gap between governments. For this reason, even after it’s been defeated at an election, the incumbent government retains full legal power until a new government’s sworn in. It continues to govern.

Important as that convention of continuity may be, it’s in tension with another key idea: in order to preserve their legitimacy, governments must retain the support (“the confidence”) of a majority of members of the house of representatives. When a government loses that confidence, it loses its democratic mandate. If it can’t re-negotiate its majority, it must either cede power to others, or advise the governor general to call an election.

The caretaker convention is, if you like, the bridge between these two foundational precepts – that there must be continuity between governments, and that governments must retain their numbers in the house. The convention has different limbs. But, in broad outline, the idea is threefold:

  • If a government loses the confidence of the house or is defeated at an election, it continues to govern until a new government is ready to be sworn in.
  • But it should avoid making significant or controversial decisions.
  • If significant decisions can’t be avoided (or dealt with through temporary or holding arrangements), the incumbent government should consult to ensure its proposed intervention is supported by a majority in parliament. (If the composition of the new government is clear, it should simply act on the incoming government’s advice).

New Zealand’s caretaker convention does not apply in the pre-election period. As the cabinet manual explains, successive governments have nevertheless exercised a degree of abstinence during that time. Significant new appointments are generally deferred, as are advertising campaigns that could create a perception that government funds are being used to finance publicity for party political purposes. Importantly, though, neither the cabinet manual nor the Cabinet Office circular in which these habits of abstinence are spelled out in more detail mentions any circumstances in which pre-election consultation with the opposition is required.

Why we should resist the introduction of a pre-election consultation requirement

So there’s no convention in New Zealand of pre-election consultation. Not yet. But should there be? For me, the answer is no.

First, let’s be clear that such a consultation requirement could not take the same form as the current caretaker convention, nor could it be justified by the same logic. That logic, remember, is that significant decisions should have the support of a parliamentary majority. It’s that outcome – majority support – to which the expectation of consultation is directed.

It’s obvious that logic can’t work pre-election. Ardern’s government still holds the confidence of the house, and there’s no new set of numbers available to illuminate where the democratic mandate will lie during the upcoming term. Were we to analogise from the caretaker convention, we might decide that a government that’s suffering in the polls should exercise particular restraint in the pre-election period. But how we’d turn that moral precept into a workable convention isn’t at all clear. And if we did, it wouldn’t assist Collins. On the basis of this logic, her moral case seems particularly weak.

Collins, however, claims a far higher ground: consultation with the opposition (by which she means National) regardless of the likely electoral outcome. But would we really want our governments to be hampered in this way when important decisions must be made? Consider that our parliamentary system is an adversarial one which hinges (even under MMP) on a political contest between the two main parties. In the lead-up to an election, that contest is heightened as the parties compete for a share of the party vote. The pre-election period is exactly when we might least expect constructive collaboration between the government and the opposition.

That’s borne out, I’d suggest, by Collins’ and Gerry Brownlee’s recent behaviour. Over the last month, we’ve seen them searching methodically for an exploitable chink in Ardern’s armour. Their style has been colourful and combative; at times, controversial. It could hardly be called collaborative.

What the Covid crisis also illustrates is that “significant decisions” (whenever they arise) may be decisions on which life and death – quite literally – depend. Collins’ contention is that, at the very moment when strong and decisive government is at its highest premium, the Ardern cabinet should seek to collaborate with a political enemy that’s intent on its destruction. To me that seems like a recipe for disaster.

It’s fair to expect a government that’s approaching the end of its term to defer significant decisions where possible. A hardening of those expectations could well be a useful development. But sometimes significant decisions are unavoidable. When that happens, as here, we need the government to be allowed to govern. An expectation of cross-party collaboration at such a moment carries with it, in my view, a whiff of political naivety.

Does Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition have a constitutional role to play in all of this? Of course they do! Their role, as always, is to hold the government to account (see here). In the exceptional circumstances we are now facing, it may well be appropriate for the government to facilitate that scrutiny by establishing a bespoke mechanism to operate during the period parliament is dormant (as, indeed, occurred during the initial lockdown).

There’s also a serious question to be answered as to whether the election should be delayed in order to allow opposition parties a fair opportunity to campaign. That call for electoral delay makes it all the more important, however, that we are well served in the meantime by strong and effective government. Until the electorate calls it otherwise, Ardern and her mob hold the Treasury benches. Let’s allow them to get on with the job.

Keep going!
Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Labour Party 2020 election campaign in Auckland (Photo: Hannah Peters/Getty Images)
Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Labour Party 2020 election campaign in Auckland (Photo: Hannah Peters/Getty Images)

OPINIONPoliticsAugust 16, 2020

The confidence conundrum: Why the election date drama is more political than constitutional

Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Labour Party 2020 election campaign in Auckland (Photo: Hannah Peters/Getty Images)
Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Labour Party 2020 election campaign in Auckland (Photo: Hannah Peters/Getty Images)

Jacinda Ardern is preparing to make a major announcement on election timing as a majority of MPs appear determined to see it delayed. Public law expert Graeme Edgeler explores how it might all play out.

Auckland is currently in lockdown with people required to stay at home except for “essential personal movements”, and will remain so for another week and a half, at least. At this time, many of the time-honoured tools of an election campaign – door knocking, and public meetings – are illegal, and leave those taking part in them subject to infringement fees (like parking tickets) of $300, or fines of up to $1000.

It is reasonable to ask whether voters are well-served by a campaign in which a third of voters, and presumably around a third of candidates are required to be at home for anything that isn’t permitted under the level three restrictions.

So, before we get to the constitutional hypotheticals, I will start with a prediction: the election will probably be delayed. I am not certain, but after the move to level three in Auckland, this was always reasonably likely. The prime minister had a few days in hand before needing to make the decision, so why not wait to allow yourself to have as much information as you can, before formalising it? With the statement from New Zealand First leader Winston Peters of his party’s support for a delay, there is just one more reason for the prime minister to agree.

At level two, New Zealand might well push forward. The Electoral Commission is prepared to run an election at level two of New Zealand’s Covid response plan. They have resourcing in place to use a form of the takeaway voting process for pockets of up 500 voters at level three, up to 5,000 voters nationwide. If large parts of the country are at level three, the process becomes more involved, as Professor Andrew Geddis explained for the Spinoff. Following the Christchurch and Kaikoura earthquakes, parliament updated the Electoral Act to provide more structure to the power of the chief electoral officer to adjourn an election to allow alternative processes to be used, which I anticipate would occur if a heightened lock down of a large part of the country occurs after the election is formally ordered by the governor general.

But in light of the calls by the opposition and New Zealand First for a delay in the date of the election, how would that occur, and what constitutional issues could arise?

Dissolution delayed

Importantly, the constitutional questions in play are mostly pretty well understood. They may not be widely known, but just as any competent second year physics undergrad could probably explain the basics of special relativity, anyone with an undergrad education in public law should be able to explain the basics.

First: while an election date has been announced, the formal order officially setting things in train has yet to be issued by the governor general. There are still MPs, and the 52nd parliament is still in existence, so there’s a bit of leeway. The first step in the process for directing an election is ending the old parliament. This can happen one of two ways: the parliament can expire at the end of its three-year term, or it can be dissolved by the governor general.

Dissolution was planned to happen last week, but after the move to level three, this was delayed. There was some room for slippage in the timetable, but if it is to happen in time for a September 19 election, dissolution would have to happen early this week, so the timetable for nominations and early voting, etc, could be put in play. If the prime minister decides to delay the election, she would simply not take the step of formally presenting the necessary proclamation to the governor general with instructions to sign it. If parliament isn’t dissolved before 2pm Tuesday this week, the House of Representatives would meet for question time, and ordinary government business.

The dissolution could then simply follow in the next eight weeks, in advance of a later election. If it doesn’t happen by October 12, the 52nd parliament will expire, and writ for the election will follow as a matter of course, with an election a month or so after the formal order that it be held. Following the usual calendar (there’s some flexibility) an election that followed the expiry of parliament on October 12, 2020, would happen on November 21, 2020. It could realistically be pushed back a week, but anything further would likely need a law change, and pushing it into next year would need a parliamentary super-majority of 75% of MPs.

Matters of confidence

But if the prime minister was set on a September 19 election, could anyone force her hand?

There are a lot of hypotheticals, but again, the constitutional processes are well understood.

Importantly, none of the serious hypothetical are really constitutional questions at all, but political questions. With New Zealand First announcing its support for a later election, a majority of MPs now seem to be in support of one. This will doubtless factor into the prime minister’s decision, but is not relevant to the question of what her powers are.

Constitutionally, the question of whether the prime minister has the power to recommend (ie instruct) the governor general to dissolve parliament and hold elections turns on whether the prime minister has the confidence of a majority of MPs.

At the time of writing, she does command the confidence of a majority of MPs. Accordingly, she has the power to direct the governor general to dissolve parliament and hold an election.

The letter sent by New Zealand First leader Winston Peters to the Prime Minister in support of holding a later election does not change this. The letter does not withdraw confidence in Ardern. Reports indicate that at a press conference on Sunday afternoon, Peters clearly stated the prime minister still has his confidence.

If Peters and New Zealand First wanted to force the prime minister’s hand, its MPs would resign as government ministers and withdraw confidence. The expectation is that this would either be public, or would be made public shortly after it occurred. New Zealand does not have a political culture of MPs or ministers informing the governor general of such issues in private.

How would such a hypothetical occur?

First, Peters would inform the PM, probably in writing, that he was resigning, and New Zealand First was withdrawing support from the government.

The prime minister would inform the governor general that she was now operating as a caretaker prime minister, with the situation of who, if anyone, has the confidence of a majority of MPs to be prime minister in flux.

The prime minister would let everyone else know this was the state of affairs, likely at a hastily called press conference.

Not having the confidence of the house, the prime minister simply would not instruct the governor-general to dissolve the house. That instruction can only be made by either (i) a prime minister having the confidence of the house; or (ii) a prime minister lacking the confidence of the house, but with clear public support from a majority of MPs for the decision to dissolve.

If the prime minister were, for some reason, to still issue the instruction to the governor general to dissolve parliament, in a circumstance where she lacked confidence, the governor general would refuse. (Which, incidentally, is why in this hypothetical the instruction is never made.)

Political v constitutional

In fact, the governor general has very little to do with any of this. The entire process is political, not constitutional. The prime minister continues to be prime minister, applying the caretaker principle, while the political process plays out. And the governor general waits like the rest of us until there are public announcements resolving the issue.

In a constitutional sense this hypothetical would be fundamentally identical to the situation following an election.

Immediately after the 2017 general election Bill English was the prime minister. The election had changed the likely composition of parliament (it wouldn’t be sworn in for some weeks), so it was not clear that that he continued to have the confidence of the House of Representatives. After time for discussion between the parties, there were public statements announcing the results of coalition negotiations, and ultimately the signing of coalition agreements. Following those public announcements, including a public announcement by English that talks between National and New Zealand First had ended, the governor general appointed Ardern the prime minister.

The situation is the same after a loss of confidence. The person holding officer as prime minister continues to do so. Members of parliament seek to find a resolution supported by a majority of MPs. Obvious options include: Ardern regains the confidence of enough MPs to remain prime minister; someone else obtains the confidence of enough MPs to become prime minister; MPs reach an impasse and agree that no resolution is possible.

Throughout all of this, executive government continues as normal, just with ministerial decision-making more circumscribed. The government has the lawful authority to spend money until June 30 next year. Teachers and police officers continue to get paid, people breaking the law can be arrested and charged, and the machinery of government continues. And the governor general stays out of it until MPs resolve their political dispute. This isn’t a constitutional crisis. Really, it’s not even a political crisis yet, but an interesting hypothetical with a clear constitutional overlay for MPs to sort things through.

Which probably won’t even happen.

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