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Image: The Spinoff

OPINIONPoliticsJuly 24, 2024

‘I’m even more concerned’: A survivor’s response to the final abuse in care report

Image: The Spinoff
Image: The Spinoff

Despite the many, many recommendations in today’s final inquiry report, there are still some glaring omissions, writes Steve Goodlass.

I’ve previously been critical about the abuse in care inquiry’s productivity and the actual independence of the inquiry process. The final report and its recommendations haven’t shifted that viewpoint – in fact, I’m even more concerned than before.

One of the most important outcomes that survivors needed from this inquiry was a clear path through the civil courts. It’s on record now with the inquiry that in the first decade of this century, the Crown deliberately and systematically sought to test its litigation strategy, set precedent and sew up any remaining holes in statute. A civil litigation attempt by survivors is blocked due to statutes of limitation, the ACC bar (which prevents anyone technically covered by ACC from engaging in a civil suit) and the question of vicarious liability, let alone the enormous cost involved in taking a civil suit against an entity with limitless budget.

Recommendations 75, 78 and 79 of the 2021 redress report dealt with the recommendation for reform of the limitations acts, a lifting of the ACC bar in these specific cases, and for the Law Commission to review any other obstacles to civil litigation, recommend corrective steps and report back within 12 months. The final report neither reinforces or follows up on this. Instead, it lets the Crown off the hook with recommendation 11. Here it says that “If the government does not progress the inquiry’s recommended civil litigation reforms (holistic redress recommendations 75 and 78 from the inquiry’s interim report”, it should reform the ACC act to provide tailored compensation and other suitable remedies.” The status quo with the Crown holding all the power remains.

At the same time this also highlights another glaring issue. The inquiry didn’t investigate the judiciary with regard to bias, or the legal profession (lawyers) with regard to ethical execution of duty. The police were called out as part of the Lake Alice inquiry but was there an investigation into how they treated complaints, and the decisions around taking something to prosecution? None of these entities appeared as part of the investigation streams but make up a critical part of the system. Compare this with the Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse that commissioned work that sought to look at bias in the judiciary and highlighted a range of issues that they could learn from.

As advocates and civil society organisations in the inquiry lost faith in it, we started to lobby the United Nations, specifically the UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT), following the pathway carved by some of the Lake Alice survivors. In its 2022 Lake Alice report, the inquiry strongly urged the Crown to meet it obligations to provide fair redress to survivors of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment based on the inquiry’s interim report (2020) and redress report (2021).

In the final report summary just released, the inquiry has made no reference to those recommendations of the UNCAT. The term UNCAT is completely missing, yet the Crown has been making its case repeatedly to the UNCAT. Now, at the UN periodic review (2024), the Crown said it was waiting for the final report before deciding on redress for the likes of the Lake Alice survivors who the UNCAT found in favour of.

As the UNCAT pointed out, the inquiry has no bearing on international law and the government must meet its obligations for redress. So, there is no support in the final report for Lake Alice for redress under international law. Rather, recommendation 18 seeks parity of redress from the two settlement cohorts where one had legal fees subtracted from the settlement and the other did not.

All of this against the backdrop of minister Paul Goldsmith’s statement to the UN’s Periodic Review of New Zealand, where he said:

“Through the inquiry process, serious issues have been raised around possible breaches in international and domestic human rights in the care system, including the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Convention Against Torture.”

New Zealand has just spent $170+ million on an inquiry only to have a minister use the term “possible breaches”! His statement is of great concern because it again points to the minimisation position continued by the Crown.

A common request from survivors has been to not have to report to the perpetrating institution. There are a variety of reasons for this, from re-traumatisation to concern about fair process. Although this report sets out recommendations for a Care Safe Agency under statute, it specifies that the agency is largely a policy setter/watchdog/data collector. Survivors will still have to go to the perpetrating institution to report. The one saving grace could be that in its role, the Care Safe Agency can receive complaints about processes about entities under its purview.

There is no mention, I believe, of the issue of bringing enablers to justice and thus no guidance or framework for achieving historical accountability. In the case of the Crown, how does the Crown investigate and prosecute the Crown when it comes to past or current heads of ministries, politicians and the like? It would seem to me there is a conundrum here as police seek to use Crown Law, yet Crown Law might be a focus of a complaint? What mechanisms exist to work through this? Looking more broadly, it appears there is not a precedent of criminal accountability in New Zealand for those who have enabled abuse. With the passing of this inquiry, the question as to how to implement that goes unanswered.

In one sense, this has been New Zealand’s largest research project around the abuse of children in out-of-home care settings. Unfortunately, with the inquiry’s final minute they’ve locked all of the data away that they possibly can when adopting the data access strategy implemented by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch terrorist attacks. No accredited researcher can access the background information to better understand what happened, to assess the productivity of the inquiry, understand the obstructions placed in its way or the internal issues.

Instead we have a handful of case studies that don’t fully cover the investigation streams the commission said it was undertaking. If you’re patient, you can watch the livestream recordings of the public sessions to screenshot some evidential documents flashed up on screen. However, we are left with significant holes and therefore much less understanding than we should have. Of particular interest to me is the fact there is no case study covering the Catholic church, yet the final report notes that the incidence of sexual abuse of children was highest in the care of this entity. The result is the bishops are relaxed, the fear of the inquiry has passed, they can see they are safe, untouchable. What a waste of a significant body of knowledge thanks to poor productivity and locked-up data.

The final report is here now. The Crown has it. Yet the Crown has delayed fair redress to Lake Alice survivors while waiting for it, ignored the information pouring out of the public hearings or in the interim reports and continued to make decisions on the care of children. This has been the case throughout the inquiry. In 2022, Aaron Smale asked government minister Carmel Sepuloni, during her push for a monitoring mechanism, whether she had read the redress report. She had not.

Then-minister Hipkins said the Crown accepted the redress recommendations and proceeded to roll out the Crown’s version of rapid redress on MSD survivors. The redress entity is still in planning two years later. This year we hear Goldsmith talk of “possible breaches” to human rights closely followed up by the same from Erica Stanford, minister in charge of the government response, in her cabinet briefing papers. This month, we roll out “trauma-informed” bootcamps despite international evidence and horrific accounts of other military-style interventions highlighted in the inquiry’s testimony.

The Crown picks and chooses what it actions, it still holds all the cards, the status quo is firmly in place – and I fear for the survivors and our children now and in the future.

Keep going!
Some of the 112 people found at fault. Image: Tina TIller
Some of the 112 people found at fault. Image: Tina TIller

PoliticsJuly 24, 2024

A long list of ministers and leaders found at fault for allowing abuse in care

Some of the 112 people found at fault. Image: Tina TIller
Some of the 112 people found at fault. Image: Tina TIller

The 112 politicians and senior public servants who oversaw decades of harm and neglect, plus those who have been asked to apologise.

The final report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care finds that a successive list of senior ministers and public servants were at fault for allowing, or failing to stop, an epidemic of abuse in foster homes, borstals, boot camps and other state-run institutions. 

The list of people found at fault includes successive ministers of education, health and social development, commissioners of police, directors-general of health, directors of mental health and the chief executives of several ministries. The Royal Commission report does not list individual names of people at fault, only the job titles.

The Spinoff has been able to verify 112 people who served in those roles from 1950 to 1999. Much of the harm started before 1950 and has continued to present day, but this list is limited to those years to match the Royal Commission’s period of inquiry. 

These individuals were found to have enabled the abuse through a range of actions, including: implementing harmful policies, failing to investigate abuse, failing to properly train staff, failing to keep children safe, illegally detaining young people, ignoring the perspectives of communities affected, contributing to abusive environments, upholding institutional and structural racism, failing to address racist policies, alienating Māori from their whānau and failing to provide redress for survivors. 

Obviously, these politicians and public servants were not individuals who carried out most of the day-to-day physical, sexual, mental and emotional abuse on thousands of vulnerable young people. Nor were they the only people in positions of power who contributed to harm. But as the most senior leaders of powerful government entities, they held the ultimate responsibility.

The list of people found at fault:

Successive ministers of social development (and previous equivalent roles, including minister for social welfare and minister for social security)

  • Jack Watts
  • William Bodkin 
  • Eric Halstead
  • Dean Eyre
  • Geoff Gerard
  • Hilda Ross
  • Mabel Howard
  • Phil Connolly 
  • Norman Shelton
  • Don McKay 
  • Lance Adams-Schneider
  • Norman King
  • Bert Walker
  • George Gair
  • Venn Young 
  • Ann Hercus
  • Michael Cullen
  • Jenny Shipley 
  • Peter Gresham
  • Roger Sowry
  • Steve Maharey

Successive chief executives of the ministry for social development (and previous equivalent roles, including director-general of social welfare and superintendent of the child welfare division of the Department of Education)

  • Charles Peek
  • Lewis Anderson
  • Ian Mackay 
  • SJ Callaghan
  • John Grant 
  • Andy Kirkland
  • Margaret Bazley

Successive ministers of health 

  • Jack Watts
  • Jack Marshall
  • Ralph Hanan
  • Rex Mason
  • Norman Shelton
  • Don McKay
  • Lance Adams-Schneider
  • Bob Tizard
  • Tom McGuigan
  • Frank Gill
  • George Gair
  • Aussie Malcolm
  • Michael Bassett
  • David Caygill
  • Helen Clark 
  • Simon Upton 
  • Bill Birch
  • Jenny Shipley  
  • Bill English 
  • Wyatt Creech
  • Annette King

Successive directors-general of health 

  • TR Ritchie
  • John Cairney
  • Harold Turbott
  • Douglas Kennedy
  • Ron Barker
  • George Salmond
  • Chris Lovelace
  • Karen Poutasi

Successive directors of mental health at the Ministry of Health (and previous equivalent roles, including director of mental hygiene).

  • Ronald Lewis 
  • Geoffrey Blake-Palmer
  • Stanley Mirams 
  • Basil James
  • Thakshan Fernando 
  • Janice Wilson 

Successive ministers of education 

  • Ronald Algie
  • Philip Skoglund
  • Blair Tennent
  • Arthur Kinsella
  • Brian Talboys
  • Lorrie Pickering
  • Phil Amos
  • Les Gandar
  • Merv Wellington
  • Russell Marshall
  • David Lange
  • Geoffrey Palmer
  • Phil Goff
  • Lockwood Smith 
  • Wyatt Creech
  • Nick Smith 
  • Trevor Mallard

Successive chief executives of the Ministry of Education (and previous equivalent roles, including director-general of education and secretary of education). 

  • Charles Edward Beeby
  • Arnold Campbell 
  • Keith Sheen
  • Ned Dobbs 
  • Bill Renwick
  • Maris O’Rourke 
  • Howard Fancy 

Successive commissioners of police

  • James Cummings
  • Bruce Young
  • Eric Compton 
  • Samuel Barnett
  • Willis Spencer Brown
  • Leslie Spencer
  • Colin Urquhart
  • Angus Sharp
  • Ken Burnside
  • Bob Walton 
  • Ken Thompson
  • Malcolm Churches
  • John Jamieson 
  • Richard Macdonald
  • Peter Doone

Successive public service commissioners (and previous equivalent roles, including state services commissioner)

  • Dick Campbell
  • George Bolt
  • Leonard Atkinson
  • Adrian Rodda
  • Ian Lythgoe
  • Robin Williams
  • Mervyn Probine
  • Roderick Deane
  • Don Hunn
  • Michael Wintringham 

The report also finds that successive governments, including ministers, were at fault. There were 224 people who served as cabinet ministers between 1950 and 1999 (this number includes people who were ministers in multiple governments). 

Churches found to be at fault for abuse in care

The Royal Commission also found fault with six churches and their related entities. The report names the institutions as a whole, rather than specific roles or job titles.

  • The Catholic Church in Aotearoa New Zealand and related Catholic entities
  • The Anglican Church in Aotearoa New Zealand and Polynesia 
  • The Methodist Church of New Zealand
  • Gloriavale Christian Community
  • The Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand
  • The Salvation Army New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and Samoa Territory 

The list of people who should apologise

The Royal Commission recommended that public acknowledgements and apologies for historical abuse and neglect be made by the most senior leaders of a list of relevant churches, government agencies and professional organisations. 

These are people who currently hold those roles: 

  • Christopher Luxon, prime minister of New Zealand
  • Pope Francis, bishop of Rome, head of the Catholic church
  • Justin Welby, archbishop of Canterbury, head of the Anglican church
  • Bishop Jong Cheon Park, president of the World Methodist Council
  • Lyndon Buckingham, general of the Salvation Army
  • Howard Temple, overseeing shepherd, Gloriavale Christian Community
  • The governing body of Jehovah’s Witnesses: Kenneth Cook Jr, Gage Fleegle, Samuel Herd, Geoffrey Jackson, Mark Lett, Gerrit Lösch, Douglas Sanderson, David Splane, and Jeffrey Winder.
  • The Right Rev Rose Luxford of Oamaru, the moderator of the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand
  • Pam Elgar, chief executive, Presbyterian Support Northern
  • Sanja Majstorović, chief executive, Presbyterian Support East Coast
  • Muhammad Naseem (Joe) Asghar, chief executive, Presbyterian Support Central
  • Barry Helem and Kim Manahi, co-chief executives, Presbyterian Support Upper South Island
  • Carolyn Cooper, chief executive, Presbyterian Support South Canterbury
  • Jo O’Neill, chief executive, Presbyterian Support Otago
  • Matt Russell, chief executive, Presbyterian Support Southland
  • Heather Baggott, acting public service commissioner
  • Una Jagose, solicitor-general
  • Andrew Coster, commissioner of police
  • Chappie Te Kani, chief executive, Oranga Tamariki
  • Debbie Power, chief executive, Ministry of Social Development
  • Diana Sarfati, chief executive, Ministry of Health
  • Iona Holsted, chief executive, Ministry of Education
  • Sharon McGowan, chief executive, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists
  • Joan Simeon, chief executive, Medical Council of New Zealand
  • Sharyn Roberts, president, Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers
  • Anne Daniels, president, New Zealand Nurses Organisation* 
  • Lesley Hoskin, chief executive, Teaching Council of Aotearoa New Zealand
  • Andrea Midgen, chief executive, Blind Low Vision NZ
  • Ralph Jones, chief executive, IHC

*The report specifically refers to the New Zealand Nurses Association, which merged with the NZ Nurses’ Union in 1993 to form the New Zealand Nurses Organisation (NZNO). NZNO’s website describes it as “the leading professional body of nurses in Aotearoa New Zealand”. A spokesperson for the commission declined to comment on whether the reference to the defunct body should have been to NZNO.

This piece was updated on July 30 to add the above note

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